COMMENTARY
Public Disclosure of Physician Information:
Who Knows What's Best for Whom?
By Robert C. Fellmeth and Julianne B. D'Angelo

he "public disclosure policy" of the
Medical Board of California (MBC)
has always borne a misnomer. It has
traditionally been MBC's policy to disclose nothing about its licensees to inquiring consumers except its own disciplinary
actions, which have been few and far between in comparison to the number of
complaints and reports about physician
misconduct which merit attention. This
policy has resulted in the dissemination of
misleading information to patients-the
very constituency whose protection is the
Board's raison d'etre. For example, we
know of a physician in San Diego who has
been sued for medical malpractice six
times in the past ten years, suffered a
$50,000 malpractice settlement in I983
and another in excess of $ I million in
1989, and has had his privileges revoked
by three hospitals in the San Diego area in
the past ten years. Last spring, we called
the Medical Board to check on his record.
We were given his California license number and told he has "no disciplinary actions against him-his record is clean."
This example illustrates two problems
with the Medical Board's discipline system: the facts that (I) he has no disciplinary record, and (2) the Medical Board-a
public agency-won't tell consumers any
of this very relevant information (most of
which is public infonnation) about serious
misconduct directly related to patient care
and this person's competence to practice
medicine.
For five years, we have focused significant time and energy on pressuring
the Board and the legislature to enhance
and strengthen MBC's disciplinary performance. Until that performance substantially improves, however, public disclosure of information about physicians
by the Medical Board remains a critical
component of the public protection function with which MBC is charged.
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THE MEDICAL BOARD'S
"PuBLIC DISCLOSURE POLICY"

Let's review the Medical Board's traditional public disclosure policy:
• MBC Investigations. With regard to
complaints made to the Medical Board,
the Board has not disclosed any information to an inquiring member of the

public until they have been fully investigated and formal charges are filed by
the Attorney General's Office. Let's assume that the Medical Board is completing most investigations within an average of six months, as is contemplated
under Business and Professions Code
section 23 19. We know that it then takes
the AG's Office over one year to prepare
an accusation in any given case, because
it is understaffed and severely backlogged. That's a minimum of eighteen
months, during which the physician is
usually free to practice. And during
twelve of those eighteen months, a completed investigation which apparently
warrants disciplinary action is sitting at
the AG's Office awaiting processing.
Yet, during those eighteen months, a
consumer who has the initiative to telephone the Medical Board to inquire
about her physician will be told nothing.
That is affirmatively misleading and
leaves the consumer with a false sense
of confidence in the physician.
• Other Misconduct. With regard to
other known physician misconduct or negligence, the Board's traditional policy has
been to conceal the following information:
criminal charges and convictions, medical
malpractice settlements and judgments,
and discipline by other state medical
boards-all of which is public infonnation.
This means that a physician could have
three malpractice judgments each in excess
of $ I million, three malpractice settlements
each in excess of $1 million, three felony
convictions directly related to patient care,
three misdemeanor driving-under-the-influence convictions, and discipline by three
other states, but the Medical Board-the
public agency charged with protecting patients from incompetent, impaired, and dishonest physicians and which knows all of
this-will never disclose any of this information.
• Adverse Peer Review Actions. Finally, with regard to one of the most relevant pieces of information a consumer
could receive-the fact that a physician's
hospital privileges have been revoked,
suspended, or denied by a committee of
his or her peers at a hospital or other
health facility, section 805 of the Business and Professions Code prohibits the
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Board from disclosing this information
to an inquiring consumer.

THE BOARD MOVES
IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION

Last spring, at a wide-ranging "Medical Summit" called by the Medical Board
and the Department of Consumer Affairs,
we urged the Board to change its public
disclosure policy in all three of these areas.
Staggering to recover at least some of its
integrity after the January 1993 release of
a harshly critical audit of its enforcement
program, the Board finally agreed with
some of these public disclosure suggestions at its May 1993 meeting.
• MBC Investigations. With regard to
MBC disciplinary proceedings, we
called on MBC to disclose completed investigations to an inquiring consumer at
the time the Board turns the case over
to the AG's Office. By moving disclosure up to the point at which the completed investigation is referred to the
AG's Office for accusation drafting, the
Board would enable inquiring consumers
to learn about very serious and fully investigated misconduct about one year earlier
than they presently can. According to the
AG's Office, an accusation is filed in 9599% of the cases referred by the Medical
Board, and formal discipline results in a
vast majority of those. Thus, there is little
or no reason to fear that the information
being disclosed will turn out to be erroneous; however, a disclaimer that "no official
findings have been made" could accompany the disclosure.
MBC agreed to this change, reasoning that it could feel comfortable about
releasing the results of an investigation
that its own investigators have completed, that such a matter is no longer
"under investigation" and that, at the
very least, there is probable cause to believe that the accused physician has committed a disciplinable offense. The Board
agreed that consumers should be informed that it has done its job.
• Other Misconduct. We also urged
the Board to disclose to inquiring consumers other pieces of public information that the Board collects about physician misconduct and negligence. Currently, the Board routinely receives in-
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formation on felony charges against physicians, criminal convictions against
physicians, medical malpractice judgments and settlements in excess of
$30,000, and reports of professional discipline by other states. All of this information is public information. Consumers could get most of it at a county courthouse, but they shouldn't have to. Patients rightly believe that the Medical
Board is the primary repository of information about physicians licensed in California, and that its job is to protect consumers from physicians who don't measure up to standards.
After much debate, the Board voted
to change this policy in three respects.
MBC decided to disclose information
about discipline in other states, felony
convictions, and medical malpractice
judgments in excess of $30,000. However, it reserved the right to identify and
conceal certain categories of these disciplinary actions, felony convictions, and
malpractice judgments which might be
"unrelated" to competence in the practice of medicine. The Board also agreed
to accompany the disclosure of this information with disclaimer statements
noting, for example, that these decisions
were not made by the Board and that
they may not necessarily be dispositive
on the issue of incompetence.
• Adverse Peer Review Actions. We
also argued that the Board should sponsor legislation authorizing it to disclose
certain "section 805 reports" of adverse
peer review actions against physicians.
Every year, approximately 200 California physicians suffer an adverse peer review action-that is, their hospital admitting privileges are revoked or restricted by a private panel of their physician peers because of incompetence or
serious misconduct. These actions are
not taken often or lightly, and-under
federal law and judicial decision-must
be accompanied by full procedural due
process for the accused physician. This
means the physician is legally entitled to
written notice of the charges, an opportunity to be represented by legal counsel,
an ability to confront and cross-examine
witnesses at a hearing, the right to put
on a defense, a written decision, and review by a court.
As you might imagine, doctors do not
routinely kick colleague doctors out of
hospitals. Among other things, their fear
of civil liability for antitrust violations
inhibits peer review action in all but the
most egregious cases. The Medical Board
recently compiled a summary of 65 adverse peer review actions taken during a
six-month period. The reasons cited in2
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elude the following: "failed to diagnose
and treat, resulting in patient's demise,"
"multiple unnecessary procedures performed," "subject's continued exercise
of privileges would present an imminent
danger to the health and welfare of hospital patients," "subject diverted drugs,"
"examined and treated patients while
under the influence of alcohol."
So, through the peer review process,
individual hospitals and the physicians
who run them can protect themselves
from financial liability due to the incompetence of other physicians. Do we patients have access to this information, so
we can protect our bodies and our lives
from the same group? Absolutely not.
The information is strictly confidential.
While section 805 of the Business and
Professions Code requires health facilities to report adverse peer review actions
to the Medical Board (thus the name
"section 805 reports"), it also prohibits
the Medical Board from revealing that
information to an inquiring consumer.
Thus, we argued that consumers should
be told of adverse peer review actions
where the cause of the private discipline is
medical in nature and is directly relevant
to patient care. On a 9-4 vote, the Board
agreed to seek statutory authority to disclose "certain final actions by health care
facilities or other bodies falling under the
provisions of section 805 of the Business
and Professions Code involving involuntary limitation or termination of clinical
privileges, when those actions are based on
issues of medical competence which in the
judgment of the Board may compromise
the deli very of patient care or patient
safety." Again, MBC agreed that this information should be accompanied with a
disclaimer noting that the decision was not
made by the Board.

THREE STEPS FORWARD,
Two STEPS BACK
Because the Board's prior public disclosure policy was so stegosaurean, 1
these decisions were deemed "historic"
and "unprecedented" by the press. Indeed, we supported the Board's moves
as in the right direction. But we see these
changes as minor, long-overdue corrections to an offensive policy, and merely
the first steps in the long journey toward
fulfillment of the Board's statutory
charge. And more decisive and courageous Board action is now required, because the California Medical Association
(CMA)-which opposed almost all of
MBC's public disclosure decisions-has
taken direct aim at the Board's new policy and has already succeeded in derailing an important part of it.

CMA Thwarts the Board on Peer
Review Disclosure. After the Medical
Board decided to support the disclosure
of section 805 reports, Senator Robert
Presley amended his then-pending SB
916, a wide-ranging physician discipline
system reform bill, to include a provision
requiring MBC to reveal to an inquiring
consumer the fact that a physician's privileges have been revoked or restricted by
a health facility. This provision was supported by the Wilson administration,
many consumer groups which have
fought long and hard to pierce the veil
of secrecy in the medical profession, and
the Medical Board.
Who would oppose such a provision?
Only CMA, a wealthy trade group representing less than one-half the physicians in California. CMA opposed it with
a vengeance, and CMA talks the monied
language of Sacramento-politicians do
not need translators. At CMA's behest,
nine members of the Senate Business and
Professions Committee (Senators Dan
Boatwright, Ruben Ayala, Bill Craven,
Leroy Greene, Gary Hart, David Kelley,
Lucy Killea, Milton Marks, and Herschel
Rosenthal) unanimously stripped SB 916
of this important provision on June 14, preferring to protect 200 incompetent physicians per year at the expense of 30 million
California patients.
What happens when a physician's hospital privileges are revoked? Not a thing.
It is absolutely secret, so patients can't
learn of it. Does the Medical Board revoke
that physician's license to protect us from
that doctor? Usually not. In 1991-92,
health facilities revoked or restricted the
privileges of 178 physicians in California
for poor patient care or substance abuse;
during that same year, the Medical Board
took action against only 51 licenses for the
same reasons. Nothing prevents a physician whose privileges are revoked at one
hospital from obtaining similar privileges
at another hospital in the same locality or
a new residence.
CMA argues that the Board should
follow up on peer review actions and
discipline licenses where appropriate to
protect consumers. We couldn't agree
more. But at the same time, CMA has
opposed needed license fee increases and
adequate authority for the Board to do
so. In 1992, it successfully opposed a
proposal to increase MBC license renewal fees by $25 per year (to $275 annually; attorneys pay $500 per year). In
1993, CMA grudgingly agreed to a $50
annual increase (to $300 annually) included in SB 916. But CMA also loaded
the bill with contingencies which would
cancel that fee increase, one of which
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has now occurred, wiping out the additional revenue so desperately needed by
MBC's enforcement program. At the same
time, the medical profession's local/state/
national trade association conglomerate
charges well over $1,200 a year in professional dues for lobbying and campaign
contributions. While CMA argues that
(I) peer review should remain secret, (2)
the Board should act where a physician
is truly incompetent, and (3) the Board's
action (not the peer review result) should
be disclosed to the public, the Board suffers due to CMA's refusal to agree to increased resources. Simultaneously, MBC
benefits due to the secrecy demanded by
CMA-the Board can ignore hospital reports with impunity since nobody knows
about them.
CMA's orientation, of course, is with
physicians who in good faith wish to
protect the profession's standards by policing their own. CMA argues that hospital peer review activity should be protected and encouraged. If peer review actions are disclosed, peer review committees would be inhibited from imposing
minor, "wake-up call"-type sanctions for
fear that publicity of any negative judgment at all about a physician would shatter a career. The CMA conclusion: Let
peer review proceed unfettered, stimulate
it, and require the Board to follow up
where warranted.
In fact, consumer advocates are not
averse to minor peer review sanctions remaining private (e.g., advice to a colleague
to review an area of deficiency). But we
are not talking about this type of action.
We are talking about decisions to limit
or revoke the right of a physician to
practice in a facility specifically because
of his or her incompetence. Those decisions should be available to the public.
The removal of a physician's hospital
privileges is a serious matter. In many
communities, it forces the physician to
relocate because small towns may have
only one hospital-usually a necessity in
the full practice of medicine. It may lead
a physician to send a patient to an unfamiliar facility where he or she still has
privileges-with the patient not knowing
why, and perhaps at some peril. The
point missed by CMA is as follows: Either the peer review process is a reliable
method of judging and assuring competence for public protection, or it is not.
If it provides adequate due process and
involves sufficient objectivity to properly
result in the deprivation of a practitioner's
access to a (perhaps the) major medical facility needed to practice medicine, why is
it suddenly suspect when it comes to public disclosure? How can practitioners say

the process is fair when it enables a hospital to remove a bad doctor and the concomitant liability exposure for the benefit of the institution, but that same decision is too ephemeral and unreliable a
judgment for anyone else to know
about?
We concede that a strong argument
can be made that peer review is not a
minimally acceptable substitute for the
state's decision about whether one should
practice a trade or profession. To be sure,
we believe that the majority of peer review decisions to revoke privileges are
both valid and made in good faith. But
that is not the point. The judges in peer
review are often colleagues or competitors of the one being judged. Economics
is frequently involved. Further, the privileges of many physicians are not acted
upon because of personal relations, income
generation, etc. The persons adjudicating
peer review have little knowledge of applicable law, virtually none of the rules of
evidence, and uncertain familiarity with
decisions made in similar cases by other
institutions. Although many may be qualified to evaluate the competence of a colleague, they are not qualified to make the
final judgment about whether that person
should practice on behalf of the people of
the state. That judgment requires the skills
listed above, and some feeling for other
decisions being made, so there is a consistency which is an aspirational hallmark of
any system of justice.
Reduced to its essentials, peer review
is either reliable as an indicator of incompetence or it is not. If it is, its final
judgment should be made public. If it is
not, it should not be taking place. In its
stead, those playing "king for a day" and
denying access to the "sovereign's forests" should play a useful role as providers of evidence and expert testimony to
an agency of the state. Such an agency
can theoretically provide the independence needed to give a decision credibility and consistency with other similar decisions. And, perhaps as important, it can
create an effective bar to practice for
those who would endanger the public.
Criminal Charges and Convictions.
As noted above, MBC has agreed to reveal felony convictions against physicians. Not misdemeanor convictions.
And neither felony nor misdemeanor
charges, both of which are public information. Further, the Board believes it
should continue to suppress information
about felony convictions which are "unrelated" to physician performance. What?
Can you think of afelony conviction you
would not want to know about before entrusting your health, life, and money to
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a physician? We can't. And what about
serious offenses which are (or could be)
charged as felonies but are plea-bargained down to misdemeanor convictions? Driving under the influence of alcohol or narcotics? Assault and battery?
Medicare or Medi-Cal fraud? Wouldn't
you want to know? Wouldn't you want
to know that the physician who will operate on your daughter next week in Sacramento plead guilty to a misdemeanor
DUI charge last week in Los Angeles?
What if it were his third such conviction? Under the Board's new policy, you
and your daughter won't get that public
information.
Malpractice Judgments and Settlements. Under its new policy, MBC intends to reveal medical malpractice judgments in excess of $30,000. Not judgments below $30,000, even though they
have been rendered after a full civil trial
complete with all its due process-protective trappings, and even though the Medical Board has access to them through
the National Practitioner Data Bank. And
not malpractice settlements, no matter
what the amount and no matter how
many there are.
Give us a break. This is all public information-even in cases where court
files (including settlement amount) have
been sealed, the fact of a malpractice settlement or judgment is public information, and its secretion by the Board
charged with public protection is offensive to our judicial system. Consistent
with their fear and loathing of trial lawyers, judges, and juries, the Board and
CMA argue that most malpractice cases
are frivolous and that all malpractice settlements are simply "business decisions
by insurance companies" which are irrelevant to a physician's competence. They
also note that, in medical malpractice
cases, one act of simple negligence may
qualify as a cause of action while that
same act of simple negligence is insufficient to justify discipline against the license of a physician; gross negligence or
an established pattern of negligence must
be proven in a physician discipline case.
Finally, they argue that the burdens of
proof vary between malpractice cases and
physician discipline proceedings: In the
former, the plaintiff's attorney need only
prove negligence by a preponderance of
the evidence, while in the latter the Board
must prove gross negligence or other statutory violation by "clear and convincing
evidence to a reasonable certainty."
The short answer to this tiresome tirade is: So what? Malpractice judgment
and settlement information is public information about conduct which is rele-
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vant to a physician's competence, and
which is tried or otherwise tested in the
context of a judicial system in which the
physician's interests are fully represented. Should consumers have to pay
for the fact that the AMA and CMA have
helped in no small measure to fashion
the laws which make it easy for a physician to hide her misconduct and difficult for the Board to discipline her? And
won't the Board's new policy (disclose
judgments but not settlements) simply
encourage all physicians to settle and
seal all cases, so malpractice proceedings
will never see the light of day? While
this may have a salutary effect on the
dockets of trial courts and the pocketbooks of trial lawyers (a result no doubt
unintended by CMA), we consumers will
never know when our physician has settled one, five, or 25 malpractice cases.
We agree that physicians in some specialties and subspecialties are sued for malpractice more frequently than are others,
simply because of the nature of what they
do. We agree that one or more settlements
(or even judgments) in some specialties
over the course of a career may not be particularly indicative of a physician's competence. And we agree that many malpractice cases are not meritorious. However,
we also know that only one in about ten
incidents of physician negligence ever become the subject of a lawsuit. 2 And we do
not agree that the Board should conceal
from the public all malpractice settlements-whatever the amount paid-and
all fully litigated judgments of liability
under $30,000.
Even in high-risk specialties, it is
possible to draw a line-in terms of
number of judgments/settlements per career-where statistical probability blurs
into questionable competence. We believe the Board has an obligation to determine that line, even if it means specialty-by-specialty scrutiny, and begin
both to (I) act in those cases and (2)
disclose malpractice judgments and settlements where their combination indicates a problematical pattern. For example, would you rather know whether
your anesthesiologist has suffered one
malpractice judgment of $35,000 over a
25-year career, or four settlements in excess of $500,000 in a ten-year career?
The Board's past performance indicates
that it is unlikely to take action in either
case; and even if it decides to take action
in the latter case, it may take MBC anywhere from three to eleven years to discipline that physician. Meanwhile, under
the Board's new policy, you'll find out
about the former case, and you'll never
know about the latter.
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Predictably, CMA patronizingly argues that all consumers are unsophisticated rubes who will go or not go to a
physician because of a single malpractice judgment or settlement. Maybe so,
maybe not. But that problem could be
ameliorated if the Board, using statistical
data which it can easily gather through
its biennial survey of California physicians, determines the point at which a
pattern of malpractice actions (both
judgments and settlements) indicates a
problem, and discloses these actions
only when that pattern is demonstrated.
CMA also warns that the Medical
Board's disclosure of this information
stamps it with an "imprimatur" of trustworthiness. And well it should. The
Board is merely passing on public information which happens to be true and accurate, and may be relevant to a consumer in choosing a physician. Consumers, by the way, pay for the collection of
this information-both as patients of
physicians who pass their MBC licensing fees on to us in the form of an indirect tax, and as taxpayers who directly
support government entities (e.g., district
attorney's offices) which must act when
the Board fails to act. The Board and the
medical profession should drop the paternalistic approach, disclose public information to consumers with accurate
explanatory information, and let the consumer who has paid for the compilation
of this information make up his or her
own mind.

Some are incompetent. Some are dangerous. Some are dedicated to their oath.
Some are greedy. Whatever the percentages, they warrant no deference in the
exercise of determinative police power
on behalf of the general populace. They
certainly should participate in such decisions; their advice and counsel should be
expected. But what many of them seek
instead is the general recognition of a
kind of medieval guild where they decide; end of discussion. And they control
what we know about that decision. This
notion of the expert "guild-meister" advancing human well-being and providing
beneficent self-regulation has long been rejected by the human experience, and has
been the subject of periodic pillorying by
the great writers and artists of history, from
Chaucer to Voltaire to Wagner.
This nation has instead cast its fate
with the following and substantially contrary legal and egalitarian principles. We
are a nation guided by laws applying
equally to all of us; we conduct our governmental affairs in public; whether one
is allowed to practice a trade or profession is a public decision properly made
by public institutions. It is certainly alluring to replace such a system with a
private "thumbs up" or "thumbs down"
made by a secret "club"-that is, it's alluring if you're in the club. But America
has long since arrived at a different arrangement-and almost all of us have
agreed to it. Almost all of us.

CONCLUSION
Physicians are trained in a hierarchical
system of authority. Especially in their respective areas of specialty, they expect
their judgments to be accepted without
question. And they coextensively suffer
from the horizontalization of society-they
empathize strongly with each other, with
their occupational "peers." Most genuinely
believe that only physicians can judge physicians. Such is the trade and profession
tribalism of the 1990s.
What some of them do not understand
is the nature of the body politic, the basic
integrity of the state. Physicians are not
philosopher-kings and we do not live in a
Platonic society. And physicians are not
judges. They are not the "parents" of consumers, appropriately presuming not to allocate already public information based on
their collective judgment of our inability
to maturely understand it or any disclaimer
explaining it. Let's get real about who they
are and who the rest of us are. Some of
these particular licensees know some
things about some problems with our bodily functions. Period. Some are smart.

ENDNOTES
I . Stegosaurus is the dinosaur with
large protective armor plates which, when
threatened, would allegedly respond by
lowering his head to the ground and turning his back toward his adversary.
2. We have also argued that the Board
should disclose medical malpractice filings, as these are also public information
which any consumer could obtain at any
courthouse. The Board has solved this
problem by refusing to even gather the
information. The Board/CMA position is
that such filings are so irrelevant that the
Board charged with protecting health
and safety should not even know about
them-even if a pattern of thirty to forty
such filings exists. In fact, about one in
five such lawsuits results in a judgment
well beyond nuisance value (over $30,000),
making these filings a relatively rich
source of useful information. Only one in
thirty or forty consumer complaints leads
to a serious investigation.
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